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THIRD GENERATION DISCRIMINATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN GENDER DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION
Catherine Ross Dunham
Christopher Leupold*

I. INTRODUCTION
In this progressive era of #MeToo and other movements which highlight the reality of
women’s experiences in the workplace and other settings, the question arises as to why
discrimination-based civil lawsuits are not more successful for female litigants. The courts have
served as an important tool in reforming discriminatory workplace cultures by directly addressing
and punishing overtly discriminatory workplace behavior such as blatant pregnancy and gender
discrimination1or grievous acts of sexual harassment.2 But the same courts have not been able to
function as a safe haven for women who have their careers curtailed by implicit bias-based gender3
discrimination brought under Title VII.4 Gender discrimination lawsuits brought under a theory of
bias-based discrimination have not offered reliable remedies for female litigants and have not
positively impacted workplace culture in any meaningful way.
Bias-based gender discrimination theory involves structural discrimination–facially neutral

*

Catherine Ross Dunham is a Professor of Law at the Elon University School of Law. She is an expert in the
areas of civil procedure and class action litigation and has written and spoken on issues related to gender bias and
pay equity. Dr. Christopher Leupold is an Associate Professor of Psychology at Elon University. The authors are
especially grateful to Lisa Watson, J.D., M.L.S.. for research and other technical assistance.
1

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); See generally Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per
curium); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1171-74 (M.D. Ala.
1976).
2
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
3
The term gender as used in this Article is intended to refer to all people identifying as female and is not intended to
limit the discussion of gender-based discrimination to persons who possess a female reproductive system and
secondary sex characteristics.
4
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344, 353 (2011); Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,
LLC, No. CGC-12-520719 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. May 10, 2012).
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workplace policies that are applied to favor the male dominant group and consequently written
and managed by a male-dominated upper hierarchy.5 Successful litigants in bias-based gender
discrimination cases must convince the judicial decision-maker not only that the law of Title VII
applies and the facts at issue constitute discrimination, but also that the workplace is mired in
multi-layer structural discrimination flowing from an implicit bias against female employees.6 In
order for federal courts to function fully as interpreters of Title VII, the judicial gatekeepers must
engage their own biases and preconceptions when evaluating the subject workplace.
This article follows an earlier piece which theorized there is an additional layer of implicit
bias-based discrimination which inhibits the success of plaintiffs in Title VII lawsuits.7 That article
argued that lawsuits seeking relief under facts of implicit bias-based workplace discrimination are
further inhibited by bias in the courts, specifically the implicit biases of the federal judges who
monitor the progress of the plaintiff’s case.8 This additional layer of implicit bias-based
discrimination, Third Generation Discrimination, theorizes that a federal judge may be influenced
by his or her own traits when evaluating gender discrimination cases which involve bias-based
theories of gender discrimination.9
This article is based on the authors’ study of Title VII cases in federal district courts over
a ten-year period. The authors studied the judicial rulings on dispositive motions in Title VII cases
and compared those outcomes to demographic information for the deciding judge, including race,
gender, age and political affiliation.10 Part II summarizes the theories of Second and Third
5

See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 458 (2001).
6
Id.
7
See generally Catherine Dunham, Third Generation Discrimination: The Ripple Effects of Gender Bias in the
Workplace, 51 AKRON L. REV. 55 (2017).
8
Id. at 90-98.
9
Id. at 97.
10
The authors used the political party of the American President who first appointed the federal judge to the bench to
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Generation Discrimination, creating a framework for the research to follow. Part III describes and
explains the relevant research by outlining the parameters of the sample, explaining the statistical
method followed, and discussing the research results. Finally, Part IV analyzes the results of the
authors’ research and theorizes how the authors’ findings can inform future discussions of gender
discrimination.
II. THE BACKGROUND: IMPLICIT BIAS-BASED GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Second Generation Discrimination, also known as structural discrimination, is a theory of
implicit bias-based gender discrimination available to female plaintiffs seeking relief for
workplace discrimination under Title VII.11 Second Generation Discrimination theory argues
implicit bias among supervisors or managers, those persons holding higher positions in the
workplace hierarchy, leads to policies which favor the majority demographics, typically white and
male,12 thereby excluding women from opportunities for advancement.13 The theory argues that
gender-based discrimination flows from “ongoing patterns of interaction shaped by organizational
culture.”14 The interactions, particularly those interactions between male employees, influence
access, workplace conditions, and opportunities for advancement over time.15 If the group that
controls access, conditions, and opportunities is all male, that group will begin to define “fit” and
“success” in terms of those who fit and are successful in the workplace environment.16 The result

indicate the federal judge’s political party affiliation. The sample was created based on available demographic
information, thus actual political party affiliation or affinity at the time of the judicial decision in the sample was not
determined. The term “political affiliation” as used here indicates only the political party of the Presidential appointer.
11
See generally Sturm, supra note 5.
12
Id.
13
Id.; see also Dunham, supra note 7, at 77.
14
Sturm, supra note 5, at 470.
15
Id. at 471.
16
Id. at 470-74; see also Benjamin Artz et al., Do Women Ask? 57 INDUS. REL. 611 (2018) (concluding that women
do ask for salary increases but receive less, which challenges the general hypothesis that women do not ask because
they are worried about workplace relationships).
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is that traits deemed as masculine will take on a positive cast in the workplace, whereas traits
deemed as more feminine will be unusual, misunderstood, and devalued in a male-dominated
workplace environment.17 The bias-based culture works to affirm gender stereotypes, thus
confirming the biases of male workers—whether conscious or unconscious—and leading to a
discriminatory workplace environment for women who attempt to join or advance.18
Second Generation Discrimination recognizes three co-dependent constructs which work
together to create a culture of workplace discrimination.19 First, the workplace utilizes a faciallyneutral policy, in which the bias-based discrimination violates a “norm of functional, as opposed
to formal, equality of treatment” by applying a facially-neutral practice or policy to a group of
similarly situated employees.20 The second construct contemplates the effect of formal policies on
the dominant group, evaluating whether a workplace policy violates a norm of equal access.21 The
third construct contemplates stereotype and bias, analyzing the effect of using sex stereotyping to
exclude.22 These three constructs create a self-perpetuating cycle of discriminatory policies and
actions.23

17

See Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 11-14 (2010) (examining gender stereotypes in the legal profession) (citing Joan C.
Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases
and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 439 (2003)).
18
Sturm, supra note 5, at 471-75.
19
Id. at 473-74.
20
Id. (the focus is on a group of employees that is predominantly female, such that female employees are
disproportionately impacted by the practice or policy); see also Dunham, supra note 7, at 79.
21
Sturm, supra note 5, at 473-74 (“Second generation bias could also violate a norm of equal access, which defines
discrimination to include employment decisions that are formally fair but functionally biased in favor of the
dominant group by using criteria that advantage one group over another for arbitrary reasons, meaning reasons that
do not advance the articulated goals of the employment decision.”).
22
Id. at 474 (“A third possibility is that these subtle, exclusionary practices violate an antisubordination principle,
which itself is a plural normative category that could include stereotyping, gender policing, undermining women’s
competence, or maintaining gender or racial hierarchy.”).
23
See Dunham, supra note 7, at 82; see, e.g., Id. at 81 (“If male managers witnessed the exclusion of women as less
suited to management, through the relocation policy or otherwise, those male managers were then validated in their
beliefs that men were better candidates for promotion. The corporate culture evolved from there into a culture with
male-dominated management—a single-sex environment that offered no check on bias.”); see, e.g., Wal-Mart
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The third construct doubles back to the first, and a continuum of unchecked bias develops:
facially-neutral formal policies develop, the formal policies are applied disproportionately based
on the gender demographics of the subject group of employees, the female employees have
restricted access under the formal policies, the male employees access management as a favored
dominant group, and the male-dominated manager group is allowed to employ discretion based on
sex stereotypes unchecked by a formal corporate practice.24 This interplay among the three
constructs creates a continuum wherein the result is a continuous culture of bias and
discrimination.25
Figure 1.1: The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum26

Phase III: The
workplace becomes sex
segregated allowing
implicit bias to operate
• Unchecked implicit bias can
lead to facially neutral
policies that discriminate and
favor the dominant group.

Phase I: Facially neutral
policy functions as
discriminatory

Phase II: Facially
neutral policy favors the
dominant group
• The dominant group occupies
the management/supervisory
positions

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
24
Dunham, supra note 7, at 82.
25
Id.
26
Id; see also Sturm, supra note 5, at 473-74.
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Although overt gender discrimination has been successfully challenged, the implicit biasbased species of gender discrimination understood as Second Generation Discrimination has
endured despite legal challenges.27 One theory for why Second Generation cases have not been
more successful is the complexity of the claims themselves.28 In stating a Second Generation
Discrimination claim, the implicit bias-based nature of the claim must be understood by the trial
judge first, then the jury, and then, possibly, appellate courts.29 The necessary understanding must
be more than intellectual, as the very nature of the discrimination claim rests in human behavior
that operates at an unconscious level.30
The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum depicts a cycle of bias-based
behaviors that self-perpetuates and creates environments that offer few opportunities for
change.31 A similar cycle has evolved in the court’s review of implicit bias-based gender
discrimination cases.32 The federal judiciary is predominantly male and over 50, meaning that

27

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989); Puffer v. Allstate, 255 F.R.D 450 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Wolf v. MWH Constructors, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (M.D.
Fla. 2014); Culleton v. Honeywell Int’l, 257 F. Supp. 3d 333(E.D.N.Y. 2017); Chadwick v. Wellpoint, 550 F. Supp.
2d 140 (D. Me. 2008); Kerman v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (FINRA), 814 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Fanelli v. New York, 200 F. Supp. 3d 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Talavera v. Fore, 684 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D.D.C. 2009);
Weightman v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., 772 F. Supp. 2d 693 (W.D. Pa. 2011); Day v. Sears Holding Corp.,
930 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, LLC, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (S.D. Iowa
2008); Coons v. Walsh Constr., 836 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Conlay v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 688 F. Supp.
2d 586 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Vuona v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 919 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); but see HellmannBlumberg v. Univ. of the Pacific, No. 2:12–cv–00286 TLN DAD, 2014 WL 1025111 (E.D. Cal. March 17, 2014);
Lewis v. CNA Nat’l Warranty Corp., 63 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D. Minn. 2014); Geraty v. Village of Antioch, 941 F.
Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Tse v. UBS Fin. Servs., 568 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Arnold v. Reliant
Bank, 932 F. Supp. 2d 840 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Clayton v. Vanguard Car Rental U.S.A., Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1210
(D.N.M. 2010); Shervin v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D. Mass. 2014).
28
See generally Sturm, supra note 5; see also supra Continuum, Figure 1.1 p. 5.
29
See Dunham, supra note 7, at 92-93.
30
See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160-61 (2012) (citing Vincent Y.
Yzerbyt et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of Meta-Informational Cues on the Use of Stereotypes, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1994) which developed the theory of “social judgeability”); see also Rita
Handrick, When it Comes to Gender Bias, Judges Have it Too, KEENE TRIAL CONSULTING: THE JURY ROOM (July 5,
2018), http://keenetrial.com/blog/2018/07/05/when-it-comes-to-gender-bias-judges-have-it-too/.
31
See supra Figure 1.1 p. 7.
32
See Dunham, supra note 7, at 96-98.
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those presiding over motions to dismiss are less likely to possess the experiences and information
that is necessary to facilitate a full understanding of Second Generation Discrimination.33 The
dynamics of judging and the demographics of the judiciary create another obstacle to relief—
Third Generation Discrimination.34

The Third Generation Discrimination Continuum (Figure 1.2)

Phase III: The
procedural rule's
interpretation protects
the dominant group in
future Title VII
litigation.

Phase I:The Title
VII litigation
requires judical
action under a
procedural rule.

Phase II:The
procedural rule is
interpreted to favor
the Title VII
defendant.

Like the theory of Second Generation Discrimination, Third Generation Discrimination
also operates on a continuum that can proceed without interruption if certain factors are present.35
Consider a hypothetical case where the gravamen of the female plaintiff’s claim is that she was

33

Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphsand-maps/age-and-experience-judges (last visited Feb. 25, 2019); see also Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a
Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR.: FACT SHEET (Oct. 2016), https://nwlc.org/resources/women-federaljudiciary-still-long-way-go/ (noting that there have only been four women justices on the U.S. Supreme Court with
three currently sitting on the Court; 60 of 167 (36%) of circuit court judges are women; and 33% of United States
District Court judges are women).
34
See Dunham, supra note 7, at 96. See also ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 97 (Sarah E. Redfield ed. 2018).
35
See Dunham, supra note 7, at 96-98.
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discriminated against by her employer through the use of discretionary pay and promotion policies
administered by male managers.36 The theory of the case is predicated on Second Generation
Discrimination under Title VII.37 Assume the defendant files a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint per Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the plaintiff has failed to state a claim that is plausible on its
face, triggering Phase I in the Third Generation Continuum.38 Rule 12(b)(6) is a facially-neutral
rule of civil procedure designed to dismiss implausible claims, eliminating the time and expense
of further pleading or discovery.39 Next, assume the trial judge lacks personal experience with
gender-based discrimination either through his experience as an attorney or his experience as a
judge.40 In the absence of individualized information about this case or these parties, the judge
may default to categorical information41 when judging the defendant’s claim for relief and dismiss

36

See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
Id.; see also Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There from Here: Implications of the Wal-Mart v.
Dukes Decision for Addressing Second Generation Discrimination, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 264, 280 (2014) (“Dukes
fundamentally changed how courts address second-generation discrimination ….”).
38
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also supra Figure 1.2 p. 7.
39
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cases holding that to survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage, the complaint must
meet a plausibility standard).
40
See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET. AL, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT
YOU CAN’T SEE: INTERRUPTING RACIAL & GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/Updated%20Bias%20Interrupters.pdf.
41
See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012) (“[E]xplicit biases are
attitudes and stereotypes that are consciously accessible through introspection and endorsed as appropriate. If no social
norm against these biases exists within a given context, a person will freely broadcast them to others. But if such a
norm exists, then explicit biases can be concealed to manage the impressions that others have of us. By contrast,
implicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible through introspection.”); see also Justin
Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2010) (citing Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 203–04 (2005)) (“In the context of gender stereotypes, children are likely to learn at
an early age that men are ‘competent, rational, assertive, independent, objective, and self-confident,’ and women are
‘emotional, submissive, dependent, tactful, and gentle.’”
37
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the plaintiff’s claim as not plausible.42 If so, the facially-neutral rule, Rule 12(b)(6), has been
interpreted to favor the employer-defendant, illustrating Phase II of the Continuum.43
Finally, assume the plaintiff appeals the trial judge’s ruling dismissing her case. The
plaintiff-appellant is now asking the appellate judiciary to assess the lower court’s action, which
requires the appellate court to assess de novo the plausibility of the claim.44 If the appellate court
affirms the lower court, this new interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) can perpetuate a general
misunderstanding of the Second Generation Discrimination claim and weaken the availability of
the theory for other litigants.45 The cycle will then repeat, as the first case becomes precedent for
the next, diminishing the viability of bias-based gender discrimination litigation and validating the
suspect employment practice.46
To test the theory of Third Generation Discrimination, which is predicated on the idea that
judicial traits and experiences impact the litigant’s success in Title VII litigation, the authors
studied Title VII cases brought in federal district courts for a ten year period.47 The study was
designed to test the relationships between case outcomes at the dispositive motion stage and certain

42

See Kang et al., supra note 41, at 1146; see also Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of
Meta-Informational Cues on the Use of Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 49 (1994). In
discussing a study on social judgeability, the authors note that because participants in the study had received no
individuating information about the study subjects, the study participants tended to judge the subjects in accordance
with their schemas, or categorical information, about the subjects, basing their judgments on general, categorical
information about comedians and archivists.
43
See supra Figure 1.2 p. 7.
44
See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that the appellate court reviews de novo
the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)); See also Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a
Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR.: FACT SHEET (Oct. 2016), https://nwlc.org/resources/women-federaljudiciary-still-long-way-go/ (noting that there have only been four women justices on the U.S. Supreme Court with
three currently sitting on the Court; 60 of 167 (36%) of circuit court judges are women; and 33% of United States
District Court judges are women).
45
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
46
See supra Figure 1.2 p. 7.
47
For readers who are interested in obtaining the complete data file, please contact the first author.
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demographic traits of the deciding judge.48 Specifically, the authors studied whether a judge’s
gender, race, age, and political affiliation impacts a judge’s rulings on dispositive motions in Title
VII gender discrimination claims.49 As is discussed below, the authors determined that age was
the most influential demographic trait in determining the success of a female plaintiff’s gender
discrimination claim.50
III. THE RESEARCH: SAMPLE, METHOD, AND RESULTS
The research sample of 160 cases was derived from a comprehensive research pool which
included 1014 federal cases decided between January 1, 2008 through April 30, 2018. The research
focused on claims filed under Title VII based on allegations of gender discrimination in the
workplace.51 The full research pool was narrowed to focus on cases wherein a single judge made
a dispositive ruling, such as a ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion for
summary judgment, and included a written opinion addressing the strengths and weaknesses of the
Title VII gender discrimination claim.52 The sample includes cases premised on allegations of
overt discrimination, sexual harassment, and implicit bias-based discrimination and includes cases
wherein the Federal Title VII claims are joined with other state and federal claims of
discrimination. Cases included in the sample were coded as either favoring the plaintiff(s) or
favoring the defendant(s).53 Data was also gathered on the age, gender, race, and political

48

See infra pp. 11.
Id.
50
See infra pp. 25-28.
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) (emphasis added).
52
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
53
See infra p. 14.
49
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affiliation of the judge making the dispositive ruling for each case included in the sample.54
A. THE RESEARCH SAMPLE
Searches for case law sought federal cases from January 1, 2008 through April 1, 2018,
including case law from all federal district courts and courts of appeal for all federal circuits.55
Searches focused on the terms “gender discrimination” and “sex discrimination”56 combined with
searches for cases filed under Title VII and related federal law addressing sex discrimination in
the workplace.57 Searches also included the terms “bias,” “implicit bias”58 but eliminated biasbased gender discrimination claims not arising in the workplace context.59
In determining which cases from those surveyed would be included in the research sample,
the authors employed the following parameters in narrowing the case law to those cases most
relevant to a study of the theory of Third Generation Discrimination.60
•

The case law included in the sample includes claims by female plaintiffs asserting
discrimination based on sex as prohibited by Title VII.61 This description includes cases
for: disparate treatment62 and disparate impact63 discrimination; sexual harassment; quid

54

See supra note 10; see also infra p. 20.
The authors included federal appeals court cases in the research inquiries but did not include appellate cases in
the sample as the appellate opinions had multiple authors or were per curium, thus not offering a reasonable basis on
which to compare judicial demographics to outcomes.
56
The actual search terms used were: “SY((sex! or gender /5 discrimination)) % "title ix" then narrowed to aft
01/01/2008, court, Labor & Employment and the term "bias". SY = synopsis; % Title IX = do not retrieve cases that
contain the word "Title IX," "implicit bias" then narrowed to aft 01/01/2008, court, Labor & Employment and the
term gender or sex! w/5 discrimination,” and “implicit bias" then narrowed to aft 01/01/2008, court, Labor &
Employment and the term gender or sex! w/5 discrimination.”
57
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
58
See Dunham, supra note 7, at 60.
59
The research sample intentionally excluded cases filed under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Title IX).
60
See generally Dunham, supra note 7.
61
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (the Court states that it takes Title VII’s prohibition
against discrimination based on sex “to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”).
62
Id.
63
Id. (“Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block to employment
opportunities. An employer may not, we have held, condition employment opportunities on the satisfaction of
facially neutral tests or qualifications that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on members of protected groups
when those tests or qualifications are not required for performance of the job.”)
55
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pro quo sexual harassment; and hostile environment.64 The sample also includes gender
discrimination cases grounded in pregnancy discrimination.65
•

The sample includes cases of gender discrimination wherein the plaintiff’s claims are
combined with allegations of race, age or other actionable discrimination.66 In reviewing
those cases, the analysis focused on the gender discrimination claims. Cases where the
gender discrimination claims could not be separated from other discrimination claims were
excluded from the sample.

•

The sample does not include gender discrimination cases where the allegations of
discrimination focused on allegations of discrimination based on sexual orientation,
including allegations of discrimination based on transgender status.67

•

The sample does not include gender discrimination cases where the lead plaintiff is a
heterosexual male arguing he was discriminated against based on his gender.68

•

The sample does not include gender discrimination cases wherein the Title VII sex
discrimination claims are not the factual gravamen of the discrimination claim.69

64

See, e.g., Perry v. Autozoners, LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 599 (W.D. Ky. 2013). To state a claim for quid pro quo
sexual harassment “…a plaintiff must assert and prove (1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; (2)
that the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors; (3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) that the employee's submission to the
unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee's refusal
to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and (5) the existence of respondeat
superior liability. To state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that “(1)
she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment
was based on sex; (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; and (5) there is a basis for holding the
employer liable.”
65
See, e.g., Antonich v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-CV-710, 2015 WL 4771551 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2015).
66
See, e.g., Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin, 126 F. Supp. 3d 521 (D. Md. 2015) (combined claims for race and gender
discrimination under Title VII and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101
et seq.)
67
See, e.g., Brandon v. Sage Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (although transgender persons are not a
per se protected class under Title VII, transgender persons can prevail on discrimination claims by showing
discrimination occurred because the plaintiff failed to conform to gender stereotypes). The authors did not include
discrimination cases brought by transgender plaintiffs in the sample because the bias issues in transgender
discrimination cases raised potentially different issues which could alter the credibility of the statistical method.
68
As the focus of the research is judicial bias against claims by women in the workplace, claims by men raised other
issues of judicial bias, for example, bias against men who complain of unfair treatment by women or other men,
which are outside the purview of this research.
69
See, e.g., Catcove Corp. v. Heaney, 685 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (allegations of discrimination and
retaliation by female land developer who alleged she was prevented from completing her shopping center
development and forced to sell property; her claims focused principally on equal protection and First Amendment
arguments).
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•

The sample includes only cases brought in federal court under Title VII, thus under federal
question subject matter jurisdiction.70 The sample includes cases that combine Title VII
claims with similar state law provisions.71

•

The sample includes cases where the legal and factual analysis is based on a dispositive
motion,72 thus requiring the court to fully analyze the pleadings and/or facts and consider
whether the case should proceed in litigation.73

•

The sample does not include cases wherein the court is examining damages awards
following a trial, motions for a new trial, or any other post-verdict review.

In addition to using the above-noted parameters to narrow the full research results to a
workable study sample, the authors also employed a coding process to determine whether cases in
the sample favored the plaintiff or the defendant. The goal of the coding was to allow for
comparison between the outcome of the case and the demographics of the presiding judge, creating
a set of outcome demographics for purposes of the statistical method.74 As the cases in the sample
represent complex litigation involving multiple issues of fact and law, including state and federal
law, the coding was based on a determination of whether any of the plaintiffs’ gender
discrimination claims were allowed to proceed to the next step of litigation.75 If any gender
discrimination claim was allowed to proceed, the case was coded as “favoring plaintiff.” If the

70

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
See, e.g., Grewcock v. Yale New Haven Health Services Corp., 293 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Conn. 2017) (gender
discrimination claims filed under Title VII and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA)).
72
Specifically, the sample includes cases evaluated per motions to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), FED. R.
CIV. P. 56 and FED. R. CIV. P. 50. The sample also includes cases evaluating a motion to certify a class under FED.
R. CIV. P. 23. Cases which raise other evidentiary and procedural issues were not included in the sample or were
evaluated only in regards to the parts which addressed other dispositive motions.
73
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (a complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (summary judgment may only be granted if the movant shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
74
See infra p. 20.
75
Id. (the authors coded case outcomes as “favoring plaintiff” based on any ruling which allowed a plaintiff to proceed
past the preliminary motion stage in a gender discrimination claim, including cases where the plaintiff could proceed
under state law).
71
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court’s ruling did not allow any gender discrimination claim to move forward, the case was coded
as “favoring defendant.”76
At times, the coding determination was complex. For example, in cases where the
procedural issue was based on a motion to dismiss per Rule 12(b)(6), the case was coded as
“favoring plaintiff” if the gender discrimination claim challenged in the motion was allowed to
proceed past the pleading stage.77 As cases at this procedural posture are in the nascent stages of
litigation, the “favoring plaintiff” code does not necessarily indicate the ultimate success of the
plaintiff’s case.78 Likewise, a denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a gender
discrimination claim does not indicate the plaintiff’s ultimate success on the claim.79 However, the
focus of this research was to assess whether a relationship existed between cases which recognized
the viability of a gender discrimination claim and the demographics of the judge presiding on the
dispositive motion.80 A focus on the ultimate outcome of the case would necessarily involve
studying the final determination of a fact-finder, judge or jury, which is less likely to generate a
written opinion explaining the reasons for the outcome and less likely to relate specifically to the
relevant traits of the fact-finder.81
B. THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The selection procedure described above resulted in a total of 160 cases for subsequent
analysis. For each case, data was gathered on the presiding judge’s gender, race, age at time of

76

Id. (the authors coded case outcomes as “favoring defendant” if all the gender discrimination claims were dismissed
at the motion stage, thus foreclosing the plaintiff from litigating the gender discrimination issues in the studied case).
77
See, e.g., Ayala v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 891 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
78
See, e.g., Yousef v. Fairview Health Services, 63 F. Supp. 3d 969 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d in part, vac. in part,
remanded by 607 Fed. App’x 604 (8th Cir. 2015).
79
See, e.g., Perry v. Autozoners, LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 599 (W.D. Ky. 2013); Hellmann-Blumberg v. Univ. of the
Pacific, No. 2:12–cv–00286 TLN DAD, 2014 WL 1025111 (E.D. Cal. March 17, 2014).
80
See infra p. 10.
81
See Kang et al., supra note 30.
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decision, and political affiliation (the predictor variables); as well as for whether the presiding
judge ruled for the plaintiff or the defendant (the outcome variable). All variables were
appropriately coded and entered into the Statistical Program for Social Sciences 25 for further
analyses.82 There were no missing values, so all cases were included for subsequent analyses to
explore the main research question.
Across all the cases, the gender breakdown of the judges was 105 males (65.6%) and 55
females (34.4%), and the mean age was 61.38 with a standard deviation 10.00. The majority of the
presiding judges were White/European-American83, followed by Black/African-American84,
Hispanic/Latin-American85, and Asian-American86. Bill Clinton had appointed the greatest
number of these presiding judges87, followed by George W. Bush,88 Barack Obama,89 George
H.W. Bush,90 Ronald Reagan,91 Jimmy Carter,92 and Gerald Ford.93 Of the 160 cases, 70 (43.75%)
of the presiding judges ruled for the plaintiff and 90 (56.25%) ruled for the defendant.
This study’s fundamental inquiry asks whether the presiding judges’ final dispositions in
Title VII gender discrimination cases can be predicted on the basis of their gender, race, age, and
political affiliation. Multiple linear regression is typically the most appropriate statistical method
used to answer such a research question, namely, whether a collection of variables can predict a

82

SPSS is the acronym for the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, one of the most popular statistical
programs used in social science research. SPSS is a product of IBM Corporation. IBM SPSS Statistics, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/products/spss-statistics (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
83
n=125, or 78.12%
84
n=21, or 13.13%
85
n=8, or 5.0%
86
n=6, or 3.75%
87
n=46 or 28.75%
88
n=45, or 28.13%
89
n=39, or 24.38%
90
n=14, or 8.75%
91
n=11, or 6.88%
92
n=2, or 1.25%
93
n=1, or .63%
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single outcome variable.94 The current study’s outcome variable, disposition, is categorical and
binary in nature.95 Binary logistic regression is a specific form of multiple regression that is
employed when assessing the predictive influence of a set of variables on a single binary outcome,
and as such was employed here.96 Peng, Lee, and Ingersoll provide a general abbreviated summary
of logistic regression analysis and results reporting97, and Tabachnick and Fidell98 provide a more
detailed and sophisticated overview of the mathematics underlying the procedure.
Because of smaller number of cases in certain categories of race99 and political
affiliation100, these variables were collapsed to avoid violating the important statistical criterion
related to minimum ‘expected values’101 and to ensure further analyses would produce robust and
stable results. Collapsing across variables is the recommended convention so long as one can
rationalize how it is done.102 As such, race was recoded into European-American/White103 and

94

For a comprehensive review of multiple regression statistical applications and procedures, see JACOB COHEN,
PATRICIA COHEN, STEPHEN G. WEST, & LEONA S. AIKEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (3d ed. 2002).
95
E.g., a binary outcome has only two possible values, here judgment favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant.
96
E.g., binary logistic regression is the appropriate statistical technique when one is looking at how a group of
variables (here, judges’ gender, race, age, and political affiliation) together predicts an outcome that only has two
mutually exclusive possible values (here, ruling for plaintiff or defendant). For greater explanation of binary logistic
regression and its applications and procedures, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK, & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (5th ed. 2007).
97
Chao-Ying Joanne Peng, Kuk Lida Lee & Gary M. Ingersoll, An Introduction to Logistic Regression Analysis and
Reporting, 96 J. OF EDUC. RES. 3 (2002).
98
See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
99
E.g., Asian-American.
100
E.g., Ford appointees.
101
Expected values are a direct function of the number of cases in each level of all categorical variables. Because of
the large discrepancy of number of cases in certain variables (e.g., 135 White/European-American judges compared
to only 6 Asian-American judges), this violation was violated. It is not uncommon for this to occur, and when it does,
collapsing across variable categories is an appropriate remedy. See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
102
See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
103
n=125, or 78.12%.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol13/iss1/6

16

Ross Dunham and Leupold: Third Generation Discrimination: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Decision Making in Gender Discrimination Litigation

non-European-American/non-white104;

and

political

affiliation

into

Republican105

and

Democrat.106
The output reported here of the binary logistic regression follows the recommendations of
Peng et al.107 According to Peng et al., the first analysis is an overall assessment of the full model
that includes all predictor variables to examine their effect, as a set, on the outcome variable.108
All of the predictor variables were simultaneously entered into the regression equation as a set109
and the judge’s disposition entered as the binary outcome variable. Results indicated that this
omnibus test of model coefficients was not statistically significant 110 at the conventional p<.05
criterion level.111 Stated another way, dispositional outcome based on the set of predictors was
predicted no better by the equation than by random chance alone.112 In some research studies, a
more liberal p-value of .10113 is employed as the criterion when the consequences of incorrectly
determining a model’s predictive ability as ‘better than chance’ are less severe. While such a case

n=35, or 21.78%.
n=71, 44.38%.
106
n=89, or 55.63%.
107
See Peng et al., supra note 97.
108
See id. at 5.
109
Multiple options exist for how predictors are entered into a regression equation. Entering predictors simultaneously
(i.e., all together at once) as done here is also referred to as the ‘direct entry method’ and is appropriate when a
researcher is not making an a priori prediction as to which particular predictor(s) will have the strongest relationship
with the outcome. See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
2
110
The statistical test performed was a Chi-square analysis with the following notation: X (4, N=160) = 7.09, p=.13).
The value, 7.09, failed to achieve a threshold that would indicate that the predictors did explain the outcome at a
statistically significant level.
111
The standard criterion level for statistical significance is p<.05. If an analysis produces a p-value, or probability
value, that is equal to or greater than .05, the result is deemed not statistically significant; significance is only
achieved when a p-value is less than .05. In this analysis, p=.13, which is greater than .05 thus deeming it not
statistically significant.
112
Id.
113
Researchers determine the p-value they will use as a criterion for statistical significance prior to analyses. The
convention is p<.05. Depending on the nature of the study, researchers can make it easier to attain statistical
significance by increasing the p-value to .10. It is not typical to use a p-value of .10 in social science research, but
permissible in early exploratory research. However, statistical significance at the .10 level is not as convincing as it
is at the .05 level and is rarely used to make definitive conclusions about a finding.
104
105
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could be made for the current study, the observed p=.13 still exceeds that criterion.114 In essence,
the overall equation for the model generated suggests that, even though there might be some subtle
relationships between the predictors and dispositional outcome, they are at best tenuous and
statistically nonsignificant.115
Peng et al. recommend next examining the overall goodness of fit for the generated
model.116 Nagelkerke’s R-Square, which is one of the most often-used indicators117 of the relative
magnitude of the model's predictive ability, had a value of .06.118 As Nagelkerke’s R-Square can
range from 0 to 1.0, a value of .06 indicates that the extent to which the set of variables are
predicting the dispositional outcome is fairly small.119
Although it is informative, Peng et al. suggest using Nagelkerke’s R-Square value as a
supplementary indicator to be complemented by the other analyses.120 Peng et al. cite Hosmer and
Lemeshow who state that among the various statistical outputs generated by binary logistic
regression, “…the classification table is the most appropriate when classification is a stated goal
of the analysis.”121 As the current study’s focus is on classification of judge’s dispositions, the

As the p-value here was .13, it is ‘closer’ to the .10 criterion than the .05 one; i.e., it would have been ‘closer’ to
being statistically significant. However, even still, the result would not be significant if a .10 criterion were used.
115
Statistical significance is a function of multiple factors (e.g., sample size, variability, random error and chance) as
well as the observed patterns in the data. As a result, there might be patterns in the data that suggest a relationship
exists but it may still fail to achieve statistical significance because these other factors. For example, if the same
patterns observed in this data were present in a sample of 10,000 instead of 160, the result might be statistically
significant. However, statistical significance can ultimately only be determined for a given result based on these factors
as they exist in the study as it was actually performed. See WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS (5th ed. 1994).
116
See Peng et al., supra note 97 at 6.
117
See id.; See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
118
In ordinary least squares multiple regression, the commonly reported R-Square statistic refers to the amount of
variance in the outcome that is explained by predictor(s). Although conceptually different, Nagelkerke’s R-Square is
a variation of this from a ‘fit’ perspective.
119
As with R-Square, a Nagelkerke’s R-Square of 1.0 would indicate that the set of variables perfectly predicted an
outcome; a value of 0 would indicate that the set of variables had absolutely no predictive ability at all. See Peng et
al., supra note 97.
120
See Peng et al., supra note 97 at 6.
121
Id. at 8 (quoting DAVID W. HOSMER, & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2d ed. 2000).
114
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classification table was examined.122 The classification table indicated that the best-fitting model
of the predictors-outcome relationship yielded a rate of 61.90% correctly predicted cases, which
when compared to the 56.35% in the null model123 reflects a 4.55% improvement in accuracy.
While not a tremendous increase, this increase suggests that the set of predictors124 led to at least
a marginal improvement in predicting a disposition favoring the plaintiff or defendant.
According to Peng et al., the next step in interpreting binary logistic regression analyses is
an examination of each individual predictor variable’s influence on the outcome.125 As can be seen
in Table 1, the presiding judge’s gender, race126, and their political affiliations’ political party127
had no individual statistically significant effects on disposition at the p<.05 or even p<.10 criteria.
Stated another way, none of these variables reliability predicted the disposition outcome.
Table 1
Binary Logistic Regression Results: Outcome=Disposition
B
S.E.
Wald’s X2
Gender
-.545
.358
2.317
128
Race
.348
.407
.734
Age at Decision
-.035
.018
3.906
Political affiliation130
.339
.345
.964
Constant
1.601
1.155
1.922

df Sig.
1
.128
1
.392
1 .048129
1
.326
1
.166

Exp(B)
.580
1.442
.966
1.403
4.960

122

The classification table is simply another means to assess the overall model fit in a binary logistic procedure. See
Peng et al., supra note 97; See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
123
E.g., percentage of observed rulings for the defendant with no influence of predictor variables.
124
E.g., presiding judges’ age, gender, race (binary), and political affiliations’ political party.
125
See Peng et al., supra note 97 at 8.
126
E.g., European-American/White or non-European-American/non-White.
127
E.g., Democrat or Republican.
128
Race is collapsed and coded as European-American/White or non-European-American/ non-White.
129
p<.05, thus this is a statistically significant finding.
130
Political affiliation is collapsed and coded as Republican or Democrat.
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Based on the Wald criterion131, judge’s age at the time of disposition was the only predictor
on its own that reliably predicted whether a ruling favored the defendant or plaintiff.132 More
specifically, presiding judges who were older at the time of disposition were more likely to rule in
the defendant’s favor than the plaintiff’s. The odds ratio B(exp) for age was .966, which reflects
the change in the likelihood of favoring the plaintiff or defendant on the basis of a one-unit change
in age (i.e., year).133 Stated another way, for every year older a judge is, the odds of correctly
predicting their decision for the defendant increases by approximately 3.40%. Overall, these results
indicate that, of the predictor variables, only the judge’s age at time of decision was a statistically
significant predictor of their disposition.
Binary logistic regression is a multivariate procedure that analyzes multiple variables in
the context of each other.134 As a result, at times a relationship between a predictor and outcome
can be influenced by the effects of other variables.135 Since the binary logistic regression results
found no statistically significant bivariate relationships136 between disposition and gender, race
(binary), and political affiliation (binary); a series of Chi-square analyses were conducted to
examine the isolated bivariate relationships.137 Results indicated that there were no statistically
significant differences in disposition, even at the liberal p<.10 level, between male and female

131

The Wald test is the standard statistical test used to determine whether each individual variable in a binary
logistic regression equation statistically significantly predicts the outcome. See Peng et al., supra note 97; See
TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
132
The Wald test uses a Chi-Square analysis to test the statistical significance of each predictor. The notation for the
2
statistical test for judge’s age at time of disposition is X (1, N=160) = 3.91, p<.05.
133
The odds ratio, or B(exp) is a value that indicates the degree to which the odds of a participant being classified on
the binary outcome (i.e., ruling for plaintiff or defendant) increase or decrease as a function of a given predictor. See
Peng et al., supra note 97; See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
134
See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 96.
135
Id.
136
A bivariate relationship is the relationship between two variables.
137
Chi-square is the appropriate statistical procedure to use when examining the relationship between two
categorical variables (i.e., the values of each variable have no quantitative properties).
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judges138,

between

European-American/White

and

non-European-American/non-White

judges139,or between judges appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents.140
As judge’s age at time of decision was found to be a significant predictor of disposition in
the binary logistic regression, a series of independent samples t-tests was conducted for purely
exploratory purposes to see if age differences existed across the other predictor variables.141
Significant differences in age were observed at the p<.05 level between male142 and female143
judges144; and between judges who were appointed by Republican145 and Democratic146
presidents.147 The age difference between European-American/White148 and non-EuropeanAmerican/non-White149 was statistically significant at the p<.10 level.150
These analyses, although informative, cannot fully capture potential racial differences
within the non-European-American/non-White category. For example, although both were
included in the Republican category of political affiliation, Ronald Reagan appointed almost
exclusively male (10, compared to 1 female) judges whereas George H.W. Bush was more gender
balanced in appointing 8 males and 6 females.151 Similarly, although both were included in non-

2
X (1, N =160)=1.06, p =.33.
139 2
X (1, N = 160)=.56, p =.61.
140 2
X (1, N =160)= .97, p =.33.
141
An independent samples t-test is the statistical procedure one uses when comparing two groups on an intervallevel scale (i.e., the scale has a common metric). See HAYS, supra note 115.
142
M=62.75, SD=10.54.
143
M=58.76, SD=8.39.
144
t(158)=2.43, p=.02.
145
M=63.77, S=10.64.
146
M=59.47, SD=9.08.
147
t(158)=2.76, p=.01.
148
M=62.18, SD= 9.48.
149
M=58.54, SD=11.40.
150
t(158)=1.92, p=.07 (the original race and political affiliation categories were collapsed to avoid violation of
assumptions related to minimum numbers of case observations).
151
See e.g., Murray v. Town of Stratford, 996 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 2014) (decided by Judge Joan Glazer Margolis,
Reagan appointee); Noel v. Shell Oil Company, 261 F. Supp. 3d 752 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (decided by Judge Nancy K.
Johnson, George H.W. Bush appointee).
138
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European-American/non-White category of race and the same sample size, Asian-American
judges were 5 times more likely to be female whereas Hispanic judges were three times more likely
to be male.152
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF FINDINGS
The authors embarked on this research without a predetermined theory of what
relationships between decisions and demographics would prove meaningful. The research
attempted to measure statistically significant relationships between the identified demographics
and the plaintiff/defendant favoring results in the selected Title VII cases, and despite some
complexities related to mixed demographics, e.g. female and non-white, the research accurately
analyzes the relevant subject.153 Of course, the relationship between case outcomes and gender
were of specific interest to the authors. As is noted above, the analysis of the sample did not find
a statistically significant relationship between the case outcomes and race, gender, or political
affiliation.154 Thus, based on this study, we can say that non-white judges did not favor either
plaintiff or defendant positions in ruling on dispositive motions under Rules 12(b)(6) or 56.155 We
can also say that male judges do not rule in a manner that shows a preference for defendants in
gender-based discrimination cases brought under Title VII, at least not in the early stages of
litigation, and that female judges do not favor plaintiffs in gender-based discrimination cases.156

152

See e.g., Hubbell v. World Kitchen, LLC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 401 (W.D.P.A. 2010) (decided by Judge Joy Flowers
Conti); Powell v. Lockhart, 629 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2009) (decided by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina) Although
there may be other general similarities within and differences between each binary category to rationalize how cases
are assigned, inadequate sample sizes precluded statistical inference testing without collapsing these variables as
was done.
153
Supra p. 21.
154
Supra p. 20.
155
Supra p. 20; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
156
Supra p. 20.
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It is tempting to classify these results as disappointing until you remove yourself from
preconceptions on gender-bias and evaluate the research results from an institutional point of
view.157 This research is an examination of judging and of the judiciary, rather than an examination
of the likelihood of success of a female litigant in front of a female judge. Indeed, if the research
demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between the plaintiff’s favorable outcome and
the presence of a female judge, female plaintiffs in gender-based discrimination cases would be in
a far worse situation as the majority of the federal district court judiciary is male. 158 In contrast,
the research serves to reassure litigants that the judge’s race, gender, and political affiliation,159
will not impact the judge’s ruling on the early dispositive motions that often determine the success
of the plaintiff’s case. However, the age of the presiding judge may impact the litigant’s success.
A. FINDINGS REGARDING AGE
The research found a statistically significant relationship between the presiding judge’s age
and the favorable outcome to either plaintiff or defendant.160 The research supports the supposition
that a female litigant in a gender-based discrimination case is more likely to be successful at the

157

The authors note here the irony that occurs in this type of research when you approach the results from the bias of
anticipating male judges to favor male defendants and female judges to favor female plaintiffs. This expectation
contains its own implicit gender bias.
158
Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphsand-maps/gender (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (in 2017, female judges constitute 34% of federal district court judges
and male judges constituted 66%; the number of women appointed to the federal bench has increased substantially
since 1970 as recent Presidents have appointed more women to the bench).
159
Supra p. 20, Table 1.
160
Supra p. 20, Table 1.
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dispositive motion stage in front of a younger judge, regardless of that judge’s race, gender or
political affiliation.161
The sample included 55 decisions by female judges.162 Within that group, the female judges
ranged in age from 42163 to 75164, with three female judges exceeding 70 years of age at the time
of the decision.165 The remaining 105 decisions included in the sample were authored by male
judges ranging in age from 43166 to 93167 with 22 male judges exceeding 70 years of age at the
time of the decision and 3 male judges exceeding 90 years of age at the time of the decision.168
The average age of all the presiding judges at the time of the decision is 61: the average age of
male presiding judges at the time of the decision is 63 and the average age of female presiding
judges at the time of the decision is 58.
The findings on age raise several complicated issues. First, age may encompass other
factors, such as time in the judiciary.169 A judge serving for a longer period may have more
experience with Title VII cases and a broader frame of reference. This broader frame may indicate

161

Supra p. 20, Table 1; see also Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/gender (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (federal judges over 70
years old are predominantly white and male thus gender and racial diversity decline in older judges).
162
Some judges in the sample authored more than one opinion in the sample, e.g. Judge Margaret Brodie, but the age
used in the sample was the judge’s age at the time of the particular decision, thus some judges are in the research
sample more than once with different ages based on the date of the decision. See Ellis v. Century 21 Dep’t Stores, 975
F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Batchelor v. City of New York, 12 F. Supp. 3d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Setelius v.
Nat’l Grid Elec. Servs., LLC, No. 11-CV-5528 (MKB) 2014 WL 4773975 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014); Campbell v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 93 F. Supp. 3d 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
163
See Cook v. Triple Transcript, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (decided by Judge Kristine Baker).
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See Murray v. Town of Stafford, 996 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 2014) (decided by Judge Joan Glazer Margolis).
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See Peralta v. Roros, 940, 72 F. Supp. 3d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (decided by Judge Nina Gershon); Murray, 996 F.
Supp. at 90 (decided by Judge Joan Glazer Margolis); Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 159
(D.D.C. 2011) (decided by Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein).
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See Morris v. David Lerner Assocs., 680 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (decided by Judge Joseph Bianco).
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See Petty v. City of Topeka, No. 12-4080-RDR, 2013 WL 5774847 (D. Kan. Oct. 25, 2013) (Judge Richard D.
Rogers).
168
See Zito v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, 869 F. supp. 2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (decided by Judge
Robert W. Sweet); Conforti v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (decided by Judge Arthur
D. Splatt); Petty, 2013 WL 5774847 (decided by Judge Richard D. Rogers).
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See Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphsand-maps/gender (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
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a greater understanding of the plaintiff’s claim or it may indicate less familiarity with common
workplace issues.170 Age may also indicate less familiarity with cultural changes, including
changes in the workplace and in society involving the advancement of women.171 As the law of
Title VII demonstrates, what is acceptable behavior in the workplace has changed drastically over
the past forty years with the evolution of actionable sexual harassment and gender discrimination
cases.172 Depending on the cases filed in a particular judicial district or the overall workload of a
given federal district court, the presiding judge may or may not be experienced in handling Title
VII cases.173 However, overall increases in litigation under Title VII suggest that all federal judges
appointed after 1970 would be more likely to have experience with Title VII gender discrimination
cases, even in districts with less filings overall.174 Thus, younger judges more recently appointed
to the bench may be in a better position to assess a Title VII gender-discrimination case due to the
prevalence of gender discrimination claims in federal court, and also due to personal experience
in more gender diverse workplaces.175 The impact of more recent workplace experience and other

170

See One judge in the research sample was appointed by President Gerald Ford. Petty, 2013 WL 5774847; several
others were appointed by President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bush. See e.g., Graber v. Mad Brewer,
Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (Judge James T. Moody was appointed by President Reagan in 1981); See
e.g., Noel v. Shell Oil Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 752 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (Judge Nancy K. Johnson was appointed by President
Bush in 1990).
171
See Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases in Judicial Decision-Making, SOC. PSYCHOL.
& PERSONALITY SCI. 1 (April 2, 2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1948550617741181.
172
See generally GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES AND FIFTY YEARS THAT CHANGED
AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 240 (2016); see also Petty, 2013 WL 5774847 (Judge Richard Rogers was
appointed by President Ford in 1975, 38 years before the decision included in the research sample).
173
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federaljudicial-caseload-statistics-2018 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019). The authors note that judges on senior status (which are
included in the sample, e.g. Judge Raymond L. Acosta, are even less likely to have experience with bias-based gender
discrimination cases.
174
See Id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 172.
175
See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET. AL, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, YOU CAN’T CHANGE
WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE: INTERRUPTING RACIAL & GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/Updated%20Bias%20Interrupters.pdf.
By
comparison, the recent controversy over Justice Brett Cavanaugh highlights how youth and more recent experience
can create conflicting suggestions regarding bias. In Justice Cavanaugh’s case, his history suggested that his behavior
in high school and college indicated bias as it referenced a past era of male-dominated culture. However, the
competing suggestion was that those experiences, combined with his experience in the workplace and on the bench,
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cross-cultural experiences would be present in both male and female judges, perhaps indicating
why age is a more important comparative factor than gender.176
The theory of Third Generation Discrimination suggests that implicit bias in the judiciary
can work to perpetuate workplace bias by using neutral procedural devices, such as the Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions, to dismiss Title VII bias-based gender discrimination cases.177 The
relevant finding here on age supports this theory. If the presiding federal judge lacks certain
experiences that tend to reduce gender bias, such as work experience in a gender diverse workplace
or experiences with opposite gender colleagues in professional and cultural environments without
a power differential, the judge may put his or her own bias into the decision making process.178
The age of the judge, more than the judge’s gender alone, may be an indicator of the judge’s
relevant experience with cross-gender interaction and resulting implicit biases.179 This lack of
experience leads to the same result that occurs in the workplace – the facially neutral decision
favors the male-dominant group, inuring to the long-term benefit of the male-dominated
majority.180 The presiding judge measures the next bias-based gender discrimination case against
the last and the self-perpetuating cycle of implicit bias continues.

served to make him more responsive to bias-based gender discrimination.
176
See supra p. 25.
177
See Dunham, supra note 7.
178
See ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87-131 (Sarah E. Redfield ed. 2018); see also Kang et al, supra note 30,
at 1160 (“Decades of social psychological research demonstrate that our impressions are driven by the interplay
between categorical (general to the category) and individuating (specific to the member of the category) information.
For example, to come to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile general schemas for Latina workers with
individualized data about the specific plaintiff. When we lack sufficient individuating information—which is largely
the state of affairs at the motion to dismiss stage—we have no choice but to rely more heavily on our schemas.”).
179
See Shari V.N. Hodgson & Burt Pryor, Sex Discrimination in the Courtroom: Attorney’s Gender and Credibility,
71 WOMEN LAW. J. 7 (1985) (research which studied the relationship between attorney’s gender and perceived
credibility showed that it was the women participants who rated female attorneys significantly lower on six of the
twelve credibility scales); see also Anne Weklsh McNulty, Don’t Underestimate the Power of Women Supporting
Each Other at Work, HARV. BUS. REV., (Sept. 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/dont-underestimate-the-power-ofwomen-supporting-each-other-at-work (“[S]enior level women who champion younger women even today are more
likely to get negative performance reviews.”).
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See supra Second Generation Discrimination Continuum p. 5.
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The import of the finding that age correlates to outcome is that aging is an ongoing process.
Despite some high profile exceptions, research indicates that Generation X and Millennials are
more diverse, value diversity and operate comfortably in less structured and segregated
environments.181 Federal courts currently house judges from these generational groups and those
numbers will only increase as the pool of appropriate candidates from post Baby Boom generations
grows.182 If what we currently know and hypothesize about the Millennial and Generation X
populations holds true, we can expect the judiciary to not only be more diverse in gender, race,
and viewpoint, but also to be able to approach gender-based discrimination cases with a greater
self-awareness of the impact of bias.
It is tempting to cajole the finding that age correlates to defendant-favorable rulings in Title
VII gender-based discrimination cases into an indictment of the appointed judiciary and the
lifetime status of federal judges under Article III.183 However, this study only examines judicial
decisions in a certain type of gender-discrimination case, thus is too narrow to support theories for
broader institutional changes. In fact, the study’s findings on race, gender and political affiliation
suggest the current appointment system results in some measure of fairness.184
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Kristen Bialik & Richard Fry, Millennial Life: How Young Adulthood Compares with Prior Generations, PEW RES.
CTR. (Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/essay/millennial-life-how-young-adulthood-today-compareswith-prior-generations/.
182
Id. Baby Boomers are those persons between 55-73 in 2019, Generation X are those persons between 39-54 in
2019; Millennials are those persons between 22-38 in 2019; and Generation Z are those persons age 22 and under in
2019. All the judges in the research sample are over 39 so the sample does not include any Millennial or Generation
Z judges. The average age of the judges in the sample is 61 making the Baby Boomer Generation the most represented
in the sample. Supra p.21.
183
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both supreme
and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services,
a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”).
184
Supra pp. 24-26.
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B. FINDINGS REGARDING GENDER, RACE AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION
The study did not find a statistically significant relationship between the outcome
determination in bias-based gender discrimination cases under Title VII and the presiding judge’s
race, gender, or political party affiliation.185 These findings are important for two main reasons.
First, legal culture on both the state and federal level has adopted the practice of forum shopping
as part of the routine litigation strategy.186 Indeed, some forms of forum shopping are healthy
strategic practices, such as when forum shopping intersects with choice of law or when venue and
subject matter jurisdiction rules allow for choices between multiple available forums. 187 However,
forum shopping often devolves into judge-shopping which involves its own system of bias-based
decision making.188 A lawyer may attempt to engineer placement of a race-based discrimination
case before a non-white judge. Or, as studied here, a female litigant may be advised her genderbased discrimination case is more likely to be successful before a female judge. These
preconceptions flow from a bias that is not only shown to be incorrect but also serves to drive the
forum decision in a manner that may not lead to the best outcome for the prosecuting party.189
As in many examinations of bias, assumptions on race and gender layer onto themselves,
obfuscating our acceptance of independent assessment and thought. This is particularly important
in matters of judicial decision-making as the courts serve as society’s interpreters of justice. If a
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Supra p. 20.
See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 487 (2010-2011).
187
Id. at 485-490.
188
See Jenkins v. Bellsouth Corp., No. Civ.A.CV–02–1057–S, 2002 WL 32818728 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2002)
(“Some states expressly permit judge-shopping, allowing the parties peremptory challenges to the judge. The
possibility of permitting this maneuver in federal courts has been broached to the Congress, but never
adopted. In federal court, the parties clearly have no right to a ‘judge of their choice.’”) (quoting McCuin v. Texas
Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983).
189
Supra pp.; see also Erik Voeten, Gender and Judging: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights
(January 25, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3322607 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3322607 (recent study
examining whether female litigants alleging discrimination in the European Courts of Human Rights fare better
when before a female judge).
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female litigant believes she cannot have fair treatment before a male judge, thus must shop her
case to a female judge, eschewing other factors of forum choice, she is predisposed to believe that
the judicial system also discriminates against her due to her status as a female. The success of her
case then becomes a referendum on what judge presides rather than what facts and law control.
Secondly, any study of the judiciary is an institutional study. The best possible result of a
study examining bias within the judiciary would be to find that judges, for the most part, do not
employ personal biases when evaluating individual cases. In the federal system, where federal
district court judges are appointed for a lifetime, findings of judicial bias implicate hundreds of
cases as the judge will remain on the bench until death or retirement. 190 When a federal judge
evaluates a discrimination case based on his or her own biases, the course of justice is perverted
and the institution is harmed. Although this research is insufficient to assess the functioning and
non-functioning biases of the entire federal judiciary, it does suggest that judges, despite race,
gender, and political demographics, assess cases based on the arguments before the court rather
than on preconceptions about gender, possibly even in bias-based discrimination cases.
CONCLUSION
Workplace discrimination is not a relic of past times. In fact, bias-based gender
discrimination in the workplace continues to thrive as women and men navigate cross-gender
contexts in male dominated industries and professions. The question remains whether the courts
can serve as fair tribunals to those claiming workplace discrimination. Many factors implicate the
fairness of any given litigation, however the study reported here does not support a statement that
male federal district court judges are more likely to rule against female plaintiffs in gender
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U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1197-98.
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discrimination litigation or that female judges are more likely to rule in favor of female plaintiffs.
The study does suggest a female plaintiff should be wary of older judges, male or female, as those
judges may be less able to understand the relevant theory of gender discrimination, especially
when the case is premised on theories of implicit bias-based gender discrimination. As human
beings, we are all subject to our biases, conscious and unconscious. But the breadth of human
experience can work to ameliorate those biases. As we see increases in the appointment of younger,
more diverse judges to the federal court bench, we have reason to be optimistic that those new
jurists will bring different types of experiences to their decision-making.
***
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